



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
Fragments of World Politics

Church & Politics in Ukraine - Pakistan Round Table
Belgium & the EU - Thoughts on Brazil - What about Cancun?



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Kring voor Internationale Betrekkingen

k i b



KIB, YOUR EYE ON THE WORLD?

Dear reader/KIB-member,

Since the foundation of KIB in 1945, it has always been our mission to inform our members about current developments in international affairs. Throughout the years, this task has gradually become more complicated but also more important. In times where people are increasingly affected by global issues, such as EU policies, climate change, and international trade developments, KIB attempts to offer an accessible platform and increase awareness on these topics. We do this by organising lectures, debates, study visits, and also by presenting our magazine *Globaal*.

Globaal is a substantial part of our organisation, considering it provides the opportunity to elucidate on a whole range of popular and less known subjects. We believe this to be of considerable importance in the twenty-first century, where people are easily overwhelmed by an overload of information. Moreover, the latter is too often provided without context. Nevertheless, it has not always been easy to accomplish these goals, which makes us all the more proud to present to you this new edition after a period of absence.

This issue highlights different themes. The opening article by Dr. Steven Van Hecke deals with the Belgian presidency of the European Council of Ministers, which will be handed over to Hungary at the start of the year 2011. This is followed by a contribution of Myroslava Rap, who will tell us more about the relationship between religion and politics in Ukraine. Furthermore, there will be a personal account on recent social and political developments in Brazil by Pedro Henrique Gomes Ferreira. Subsequently, Kevin Keyaert will address the issue of Pakistan on the occasion of our recently organised roundtable discussion. Finally, the challenges of Cancun's climate conference will be discussed by Maite Morren.

We thank the authors for their valuable contributions and hope you will enjoy reading this issue of *Globaal*.

Leuven, December 2010

Inge Schroijsen – President of KIB
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If you would like to contribute by writing an article on an international topic, feel free to contact us. Articles will not be published anonymously and the authors take full responsibility. The board of KIB retains the right to refuse, shorten or edit all articles.

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THE EU, BELGIUM AND THE 2010 ROTATING PRESIDENCY

Steven Van Hecke

Since 1 July 2010 Belgium holds the rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers. So far national and EU media have labelled it 'successful', confirming the good reputation Belgium has in the premises around the Schuman Square and living up to relatively high expectations. But why has Belgium such a good reputation and why do many people expect a lot? Is it still possible to run a successful Presidency under the Lisbon Treaty? And if so, what could the Hungarians, who will start their term on 1 January 2011, learn from the Belgian example?

What is so special about Belgium?

When looking at the Belgian Presidency one should keep a few things in mind, things that might explain the performance of the Belgians. First, unlike any other EU Member State, even the ones that are federally organised such as Austria and Germany, Belgian ministers from the subnational level – regions and communities as they are called – chair a number of Council configurations. The Environment Council, for instance, is chaired by the Flemish Minister for the Environment, Joke Schauvliege. Therefore it is not a federal but a subnational minister that represents the EU Member

States at the UN Climate Conference in Cancún. No other member state grants its subnational entities direct access to EU decision-making in such a way. Given the fact that Belgium has still a care-taker government at the federal level, the ministers from the regions and the communities give stability to the Council Presidency. But one must also say that this system of representation is highly costly in terms of coordination, regular tensions between federal and subnational ministers included.

Second, Belgium is probably one of the few Member States in which there still exists a permissive consensus about European integration. The political elite, the media and the public opinion are

still very much in favour of the EU, not to say a federal Europe. It also means that European issues have a low saliency and that, for instance, the New Flemish Alliance (*Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*, N-VA), the party that won the last federal elections and favours an independent Flanders, is to a large degree a classical Belgian party since it supports European integration, similar to the mainstream political parties. One should add that this has not always been the case. It is a historical myth that Belgium has always been in favour of ‘more Europe’.



Schuman Square

In the early 1950s, for instance, the period of the Rome Treaties, the Belgian foreign minister refused the offer of the other Member States to have the seat of the European institutions in Brussels. And today, Belgium is not a good example

when it comes to the transposition of EU legislation in national and subnational laws. It is one of the regular clients of the European Court of Justice.



View of Wetstraat from Schuman Square

Third, Belgium is said to have a number of assets that not all Member States have. (1) The Schuman Square is quite nearby, of course, at least in physical terms. Belgian politicians do not have to travel when they attend or chair Council of Ministers’ meetings. The same applies to civil servants and diplomats. (2) Belgians are known for their language skills but one should also say that the French knowledge of the younger generations is as good as the English of the older generations, to put it positively. (3) Belgium is an experienced chair: it is now its 12th Presidency. Of course, no one of the

1950s and 1960s is still around and the Union changed considerably since Belgium's last Presidency, but a relatively high number of people that were already there in 2001 still occupy important positions. This applies much less to the ministers since turnover is quite high, Finance Minister Didier Reynders being the exception that proves the rule. After Jean-Claude Juncker he is the oldest serving member of the ECOFIN Council, one of the most important Council configurations. (4) Belgium has started to prepare itself long in advance, even though it was not sure which treaty would be in force. The preparation was also very thorough since it involved all sectors and levels of the Belgian political system. (5) Belgium also has the advantage that no other Member State starts being suspicious when something is proposed, something is done etc. As a small and pro-European Member State, it has no 'hidden agenda'. Its interests are almost identical with the European interests. By comparison, if, for instance, France takes an initiative, everyone starts looking at what lies behind. (6) Belgian politicians are known for their specific political culture too.

They know how to handle different and often opposing preferences, how to deal with different languages etc. They are trained in finding a consensus. It is clear, however, that this kind of asset has lost some of its credibility, as long as there is no new federal government.

The fourth and last characteristic that makes the Belgian case specific is precisely the fact that Belgium has no government. It will be the first time that the Council of Ministers is chaired by a care-taker government during the whole semester. The lack of a stable executive that is able to act might be a concern for the financial markets, it is much less of a concern as far as the rotating Presidency is concerned, simply because of the reasons that have been mentioned: the involvement of ministers from the subnational level, the long and sound preparation, the experienced civil servants and diplomats etc. A journalist of the *Financial Times* even added that with a care-taker government ministers are not distracted by domestic issues. They have all the time they need to chair the Council of Ministers.

Lisbon makes things weaker and stronger at the same time

It is therefore no big surprise that Belgium has a good reputation and the expectations for its Presidency are relatively high. But is Belgium able to live up to these expectations, especially if one knows that the Treaty of Lisbon changed the rotating Presidency dramatically? Before answering that question or, in other words, before taking a closer look at how Belgium deals with this particular challenge, let us face the changes the Treaty of Lisbon has induced.

First, one must refer to the establishment of a permanent President of the European Council - who happens to be a Belgian by the way - replacing the prime minister as chair. The foreign affairs minister of the rotating Presidency also lost half of its job as the Foreign Affairs Council is now chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Foreign Affairs Minister. The foreign affairs minister of the rotating Presidency only chairs the General Affairs Council. These changes are most obvious, they have become well-known, and they

have a direct effect on the rotating Presidency. It has, among other things, lost its visibility, its *grandeur*, as the Union is now represented externally by Herman Van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton.



Herman Van Rompuy

Secondly, one must also look at the indirect changes. If, for instance, the European Parliament becomes much stronger as it has more competences and a bigger say in the EU budget, this inevitably affects the way the Council operates. At the end of the day, it is with the European Parliament that the Council has to find an agreement on legislative and budgetary matters. Thirdly, not everything that is in the Lisbon Treaty is new. A lot is simply

the formalisation of what existed before. Take for instance the Trio Presidency, the rule that three consecutive rotating Presidencies have to work together in order to present a common 18 month programme. The first time this rule was applied was in 2007. The Lisbon Treaty has simply confirmed this. This is not to say, however, that the Trio should be overestimated. On the contrary, the Trio does not really seem to matter, except in the preparation phase of a rotating Presidency. Fourth, the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty are often vague and limited. As the legal basis is small, much room for interpretation is left for those who are implementing the Treaty. Fifth, a number of exceptions still make the rotating Presidency more relevant than some one might think at first sight. Although the minister of foreign affairs is no longer chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, for instance, at COREPER level the rotating presidency is still in place. Finally, one must not forget the rationale behind a lot of the changes. The Lisbon Treaty does not only want to make the EU more democratic, more transparent and more effective, it also wants to

enhance the continuity of the system. Continuity should prevail when it comes to agendas, to policies and to leadership. Taken these changes (or the absence of change) together, the rotating Presidency finds itself in a system that is still in the making, a system in which everyone has to find its place, a system that creates a number of opportunities for those who want to take advantage of the new situation as well.



What do the Belgians do then?

Belgium has understood the Lisbon Treaty correctly. If one wants to be influential in the new system, the rules of that new system should be applied. So Belgium decided not to come up with a long list of priorities, as was traditionally the case. Agenda-setting is now something to be done by the European Commission and by the President of the European Council.

Belgium simply allied its ambitions with all kinds of issues and legislation that was already on the table, everything that was in the so-called pipeline. Instead of presenting a Belgian agenda for the EU, an EU agenda for Belgium became the guideline. Furthermore, Belgium favours a speedy and effective transition towards the post-Lisbon EU system. No more trials to be as important, as visible as the rotating Presidency was before. No, instead of that: try to make the system work. Try to make it work as smoothly as possible, acting in the 'spirit' of the Lisbon Treaty. This means, among other things, that Lisbon should make the EU more effective. Making the EU more *handlungsfähig* (having the ability to act) in foreign affairs, for instance, is something the Belgians have supported by helping to establish the European External Action Service (EEAS), the new EU foreign ministry. In order to let the new *modus operandi* work properly, Belgium also want to set the 'right' precedents. This line is taken as a matter of principle but also because of pragmatic reasons. Belgium and a couple of other Member States are not particularly

confident in the way in which Hungary, Poland, Denmark etc. will run the rotating Presidency. They fear a kind of eurosceptic wave taking over the Council of Ministers. In order to prevent that, one must shape the system in such a way that a eurosceptic line of action is no longer possible. Or at least it loses a lot of its effectively.

Belgium itself has already shown what that means by applying its own general rules. It first of all has invested a lot in having a good working relationship with the European Commission and with the European Parliament. Even more, the so-called *méthode communautaire* should be the dominant way of doing things at the EU level. Next, Belgium has presented itself as a service provider for Van Rompuy and Ashton. At first sight this is a bit surprising as Belgium has traditionally opposed the intergovernmental organisation of the EU. At the time of the European Convention, for instance, Belgium was very much against the introduction of a permanent President of the European Council. That eventually a Belgian got that position makes things much easier, of course. One could even wonder

what the attitude of the Belgians would have been if someone else would have taken that job. At second sight the support for Ashton is not surprising either. Belgium has always supported the europeanisation of foreign affairs. Now someone is acting accordingly, one must facilitate this position, the Belgians say. Generally speaking, the way the Belgians chair the different Council configurations has been very much result oriented. They act as honest broker, as negotiator or as mediator, not defending their own interests but to get as much agreements as possible before 31 December. Belgium seems to act relatively eager in that respect. The most important tool to achieve these agreements has been the so-called trialogues, the informal negotiations between the Council of Ministers, represented by the rotating President, and the European Parliament. It is here that (package) deals are being made, that legislation is being decided.

So far this Belgian way of running the Council Presidency has been very effective. In all kinds of dossiers breakthroughs have taken place, for instance when it comes to the legislation regarding the

financial sector, the establishment of the EEAS and the enlargement with Serbia.¹ Some dossiers are still waiting for a final outcome, however, such as the revision of the parental leave directive, the introduction of a European patent and the 2011 budget. It is also clear that the Belgian Presidency did not sit on the first row when there was no particular role to play as chair of the Council of Ministers. This was, for instance, the case with the Roma, the Euro crisis and all the bilateral and multilateral summits, such as the G-20 in Seoul.



And what can the Hungarians (and the Poles) learn from that?

If the Belgians were to advice the Hungarians who will chair the Council of Ministers in the first half of 2011 (and the Poles in the second half), what would they tell them? First, it might be interesting

to take a close look at the advantages and disadvantages Belgium has at its disposal. Some might apply to Hungary; others don't. Hungary is not a member of the Euro zone and this might affect its Presidency in a negative way. How convincing will the Hungarian Minister of Finance chairing the ECOFIN Council be if the Euro still dominates the agenda? But Hungary (like Poland) also has some advantages Belgium hasn't. It has a single party government with a large majority in the parliament. In theory, this should lead to a rather peaceful domestic environment when ministers take up their job in Brussels. Secondly, one must not expect much in terms of agenda-setting power and external representation. Irrespective of the question whether Member States could make a difference in the 'old' system, the 'new' system is very clear: one should not see the rotating Presidency intervening here. Third, one does expect the rotating Presidency to act as a chair and do everything it can to do it properly. This will require first of all time investment. But with the 'new' system becoming more complex and legislation now

predominantly being made in the triangle between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament, co-ordination between these institutions will become more important than it already was. Especially for the prime minister of the Member State holding the rotating Presidency there is a lot of potential here as it is he or she who can establish regular, informal contacts with the presidents of the Commission and the Parliament. Fourth, as far as visibility is concerned, the picture is mixed. The rotating Presidency might still be a unique opportunity to explain the EU to the domestic audience, especially if the Member State is new and chairing the Council of Ministers for the first time. But one should not overestimate the possible effect. So far there is no empirical evidence that supports the thesis that a rotating Presidency leads to a better knowledge of the EU, let alone to bridging the gap between Brussels and the Member State involved. As far as external visibility is concerned, the situation is even more dramatic. Holding the rotating Presidency or not, people will continue to associate Hungary with the *puszta* and *goulash* or, if

one has followed the news recently, *Jobbink* and *Kolontar*. The rotating Presidency is not the right tool to change the country's image in Europe. It is not designed for that and especially with the Lisbon Treaty it will not work that way. Contrary to that, having a good PR in Brussels is crucial for the Member State's reputation. A new Member State holding the rotating Presidency is like passing a second EU exam. The Brussels' people will have a close look at the performance and comment accordingly. If one wants to increase its seriousness in the EU, the rotating Presidency is there to help. But performance – whether internally, externally or in Brussels – does not depend anymore on the ways in which unforeseen events have been handled. The framework of the rotating Presidency is now much more stable. It means less drama, indeed, but generates a rather fair return on investment if you take the preparation seriously, if you organise yourself properly etc. This is of course everything but to reshuffle the government portfolios and the administrative system only a few months prior to the start of the rotating Presidency.

And finally, performance (or the perception of performance; reputation) also depends on actors' behaviour, especially the expectations, whether justified or not. If they are low, and in the case of Hungary they are low, one can always say that low expectations have at least one advantage: it will be very difficult not to surprise people in a positive way.

Towards collective leadership in the EU

The Lisbon Treaty has decapitated the rotating Presidency but it also brought it back to the basics: chairing the Council of Ministers and everything that involves. For sure, Belgium has done everything it can to facilitate that process. At the same time, it has not prevented Belgium to take advantage of the specific internal and external environment that surrounds the rotating Presidency. Even more, there are no reasons why not every Member State can do the same. Especially within a system of dispersed power, multiple actors and polycentric opportunity structures, Hungary and every other Member State should be able

to find its role, to take responsibility and to make a difference. The post-Lisbon rotating Presidency is only one of these structures, indeed, but it is still an important one. It has lost much of its *envergnre* but as always in politics and as every political scientist knows, that is not

to say that it has necessarily lost its overall relevance.

¹ See the mid-term evaluation report: Edith Drieskens, Steven Van Hecke and Peter Bursens, The 2010 Belgian Presidency: Driving in the EU's Back Seat, SIEPS report, 2010, 89p. (www.sieps.se/en)

Want to know more?

Jan Beyers en Peter Bursens (2006): *Europa is geen buitenland. Over de relatie tussen het federale België en de Europese Unie*, Leuven: Acco, 217p.

Peter Van Kemseke (i.s.m. Ward Dendievel) (2010): *België aan het hoofd van Europa (1948-2010)*, Antwerpen: Garant, 191p.

Simone Bunse (2009): *Small States and EU Governance. Leadership through the Council Presidency*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 290p.

Steven Van Hecke is Senior Research Fellow at the Political Science Department of the University of Antwerp. His book on this subject will come out next year. Meanwhile, Dutch speakers are welcome to come and listen what he has to say on an evening about the Belgian presidency, the 16th of December 2010, 20h00 in auditorium AV 91.12.

CHURCH AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY UKRAINE

Myroslava Rap

Contemporary Ukraine is a good example of a country that demonstrates how close ties between religion and state can be detrimental to the former. Ukraine is a state in Central-Eastern Europe with approximately 47 million inhabitants and it is the largest country in Europe (if one excludes Russia, a big part of which is situated in Asia).



Map of Ukraine


78 % of the population are ethnic Ukrainians, 17 % Russians, besides there are other ethnic minorities, e.g. Crimean Tatars, Belorussians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Moldovans, Jews. The only official language is Ukrainian, but also Russian is widely spoken.

The history of Ukraine is that of a constant strife for independence. After the thriving medieval state of Kievan Rus' in the IXth-XIIth centuries, different parts of Ukraine in the course of history belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Tsardom of Moscow, the

Austro-Hungarian Empire, Poland, and the Soviet Union. After being part of the Soviet state during around 70 years, Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Now Ukraine is a republic with a semi-presidential system of governance.

An important feature of Ukraine is its regionalism. Historical cleavages influenced the identity of different parts of the country especially concerning the relations

with Russia with which Ukraine in different degrees shared the last 500 years of its history. We witness clear regional differences between the predominantly nationalistic Western parts and the more Russian-favourable Eastern regions. This factor is evident also with regard to the religious denomination that prevails in a particular area.



Denominational map of present-day Ukraine (number of communities for 01/01/2010)


In terms of religion, contemporary Ukraine may be characterised as a pluralistic country. It means that

even though the majority of the population is Christian Orthodox, there are also other religions

strongly present in society. Orthodoxy, the dominant confession, represents 51.5 percent of the total number of believers in Ukraine. At the same time, new tendencies appear in the last years, for instance, the growing number of the communities of non-traditional denominations. Obviously, this happens at the expense of the number of traditional Orthodox and Catholic parishes. Roman Catholicism in Western regions, the Islam in the Crimean peninsula, multiple Protestant organisations practically in every part of the country contribute to the development of the network of religious organisations in Ukraine. Pluralism, not only in the religious sphere, but also in politics and ideology are objective realities of the country.

Among the variety of religious denominations in the country there are four that are considered traditional because of the number of believers and their common historical roots of more than 1000 years ago. Those are the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox

Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church. Kievan Rus, the medieval state of Eastern Slaves with the capital in Kyiv (nowadays the capital of Ukraine), was christianised in 988 by the decision of the ruler Volodymyr the Great. According to legend, among different confessions of his time Volodymyr chose the Orthodoxy of the Constantinople Patriarchate to be the state religion. Four traditional Christian Churches in Ukraine derive from that root. How did it happen, however, that from one Church we nowadays have four? It would be right to claim that the line of division among the traditional Churches in Ukraine concerns the national identity and the politics that they support. Let us illustrate this by some facts. Below you can see the number of communities of each of the traditional churches in Ukraine (of Kyiv tradition).



The years that followed the independence of Ukraine were characterised by the great spiritual revival. All the Churches at that time shared the same feature: they were quantitatively and qualitatively growing. After the Churches had significantly rebuilt their structures, they concentrated more on the deeper assessment of their role and place in society.

This resurgence of religion was influenced by a variety of factors, including, in particular, the political situation in the country. In times of the Soviet Union religious confessions except for the Russian Orthodox Church were forbidden. The Russian Orthodox Church could exist legally, however, for that it paid the price of cooperation with the state and non-protest against the inhuman actions of the totalitarian Soviet regime. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church that belongs to the Moscow Patriarchate has enjoyed a certain administrative autonomy since 1990, being nevertheless dependent upon the Moscow Patriarchate. Two other present-day Orthodox denominations – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church appeared or reappeared in the early

1990s as a result of the internal split in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. Reasons for that were the identity, the search for historical justice and the political developments in the young Ukrainian state.

The main ground for division was national identity. The creation of an independent Ukraine was accompanied by the rise of national-oriented and nationalistic movements. Their ideologies unsurprisingly aimed at sustaining the existence of a separate Ukrainian national identity as different from the Russian. In this regard, the existence on the territory of Ukraine of the dominant Church (that is the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate) that was officially subordinated to the spiritual centre abroad was perceived as the evidence of the continuous presence of the former empire. Already in 1989 on the wave of the nationalist movement that preceded the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was re-established. Later in 1992, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate was created by the unification of a number of

bishops and believers of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate with those of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. This union was backed by the highest state authorities including the President, parliamentary deputies, and national state-oriented and radical-nationalist political parties. The protagonists followed the logic that in an independent state there should be an independent Church. The leaders of that Church and some politicians went even so far as to demand to grant this Church the status of the official state confession even though this contradicts the Ukrainian Constitution that declares the separation of state and Church and the prohibition of the favouritism of any denomination.

The Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church is dominant in Western Ukraine. After this region was annexed by the Soviet Union in the course of World War II, the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church was prohibited and suppressed in 1946 because of its strong Ukrainian national identity. Notwithstanding the persecutions of the clergy and believers, this Church existed in the underground until the fall of the communist state. Following the strong campaigning [18]

for the official recognition of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, it was legalised in 1989. Today the followers of that Church reside mostly in the West of Ukraine and strongly support pro-Western democratic ideas and the distinct Ukrainian identity of the country.

Today the support of particular political developments, the practice of the language of Church services, the ambitions of certain Church leaders, the involvement of the Church in politics and the interference of politicians into the Church affairs affect the balance of power among the Ukrainian Churches. For instance, after the last presidential elections, we obviously witness that the President and his government give preference to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. A few days before the official takeover of his post, Viktor Yanukovich participated in the prayer led by the Head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate Patriarch Volodymyr. In the morning of his inauguration day, February 25 2010, the newly elected President Viktor Yanukovich was blessed by the Head of the Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill who especially arrived in Ukraine for

this occasion. That event became a part of the official inauguration ceremony and was perceived by many religion reviewers as one more demonstration of Ukraine as the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate. The usual practice until now was that the new President was blessed by the leaders of all major confessions in Ukraine without any preference to a particular denomination.

Another recent development that will influence the current interconfessional situation in Ukraine is the introduction of the doctrine of the Rus' World. Presented first by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia on November 3, 2009 at the Third Russian World Assembly in Moscow, this concept delineates the foundations of the future activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in the former Soviet territories inhabited by Orthodox people. It is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by the notion Rus' World. It may be broadly defined as the common civilisational space founded on three pillars: Orthodoxy, Russian culture and especially language and the common historical memory together with the common vision of the further development of society.

The centre of the Rus' World is, according to Patriarch Kirill, historical Rus', that is present-day Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia, and surprisingly even Moldova. At the end of this speech introducing the new doctrine, the Patriarch clearly stated that independent states that exist on the territory of the historical Rus' and are aware of their shared civilisational heritage can continue to build together the Rus' world as a common above-national spiritual project. This would mean that a state belongs to the Rus' world if the Russian language is used there as the language of international communication and if the common historical memory and the common values for the future development are preserved. It is worth mentioning that even though Patriarch Kirill speaks about the Rus' world, he often mixes this notion with Russia itself. Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church that should care about the spiritual good of its believers engages into geopolitics and becomes a tool in pursuing the political interests of the Russian state. To put it in another way, Patriarch Kirill brought the topic of the all-Slavs Orthodox unity in the pastoral agenda of the Russian Orthodox

Church. The question remains, whether such an interpretation of the Church's mission corresponds to the correct understanding of the tasks of this institution.

As a reaction to those words, a number of commentators noted that for the country Ukraine the participation in this above-national project can mean only one thing – the end of the project of “independent Ukraine” as such. Even though we would not approve of the extreme understanding of this doctrine, we do agree that such a controversial idea provokes a division in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church because it puts its faithful in front of the dilemma either to become nationless Rus’ people or to look for another confession to fulfil their spiritual needs. It is questionable whether after such words of Patriarch Kirill, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which has so far been the least nationalistic Church in Ukraine and by this attracts a great number of believers, would be able to preserve its present position. This concerns first of all those Ukrainians who have a strong national identity and do not want to be members of a Church that leads them into subordination to another state.

The doctrine of the Rus’ World was intensely promoted by Patriarch Kirill during his pastoral visit to Ukraine in July 2010. Although the vision of the Rus’ World got predominantly negative estimations, some experts believe that the summer visit of Patriarch Kirill can prompt closer cooperation between the Orthodox Churches in Ukraine. In this way, at the first glance negative doctrine of the Rus’ World can start the internal revival of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Some religious observers compared the effect that the Rus’ World doctrine of Patriarch Kirill might have with the so-called famous “Tuzla effect” that we observed in Ukrainian society in 2003. Tuzla Spit Island is an island in the middle of the Strait of Kerch on the sea boarder between Russia and Ukraine. In October 2003 there was a dispute about the ownership of Tuzla Island when Russia claimed this sandy island to belong to it and started the construction of a causeway in the direction of the island. The President of Ukraine at that time (quite a Russian friendly fellow) and all the fractions in the Parliament solidly sustained the national interests of the country, and a growing patriotism among the citizens even in Eastern and

Southern Ukraine was observed. Therefore, perhaps similar consequences can also be traced concerning the Church question when, instead of fuelling Russophile sympathies, Patriarch Kirill with his ideas of an all-Slavic Orthodox unity will stimulate pro-Ukrainian tendencies in society.

We encounter the situation of religion being a factor of political and national mobilisation which is so conspicuously evident in the situation of Ukraine. National identity and religion are closely linked and the biggest number of believers is found in those regions of the country where the Ukrainian national consciousness is high and the Ukrainian-language proficiency is the highest. This fact can easily be explained. The close link between

religion and national identity is connected with the centuries-old statelessness of Ukraine under the rule of Poles, Russians and later Soviets. One of the ways to distinguish a Ukrainian from a Catholic Pole or an Orthodox Russian in Western Ukraine was by one's adherence to the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church and this Church was a powerful source of resistance to the communist rule. However, in present-day Ukraine, by gaining temporary benefits through the direct close bonds with politics, the Church runs the risk of losing the credibility of its evangelical message in the long-term perspective as well as in the escalation of the interconfessional rivalry.

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BRAZIL: “ORDER AND PROGRESS”?

Pedro Henrique Gomes Ferreira

In each edition of Globaal, an international student is given the opportunity to write something about his home country. This time, political sciences student Pedro Henrique Gomes Ferreira shares his thoughts on Brazil.

This article’s title is the motto on the Brazilian national flag. The ideas of order and progress are pertinent in the actual context of this country. Since his first mandate, in 2002, President Lula da Silva successfully developed and implemented social welfare policies focused on eradicating extreme poverty in Brazil. This can be considered as progress. However, there are still major issues in Brazilian politics, such as education inequality and corruption, which deserve to be dealt with in order to attain sustainable progress.



Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

Lula became a respected politician not only in Brazil but also internationally. Due to the success of his social welfare programs he won several prizes and was even chosen as “personality of the year 2009” by the French newspaper *Le Monde*¹. These international recognitions have had a positive effect on his image increasing even more his influence in the world political scene.

Brazil, alongside with Russia, India and China is a leading emerging economy. That makes Brazil an attractive market for both national and international

investors. Consequently, credits are easier to be obtained, and lately even the lower classes are able to participate in the recent economic expansion starting up new businesses and creating jobs since the beginning of Lula da Silva's first mandate in 2003.

Another improvement in Brazil over these last nearly 8 years is that the poorest layers of society can, thanks to the state's financial support (through programs such as Fome Zero, Bolsa Familia), "eat three times a day" (quoting the President during his campaigns) and send their children to school. Quality of life in this respect has surely increased for the 40 millions of Brazilians who lived below the poverty line². Moreover, Brazil's score at the Human Development Index has risen from 0.649 in 2000 to 0.699 in 2010³.

Last October, Brazil elected the first female President, Dilma Roussef, who will assume on January 2010. The elected President has emphasized during her whole campaign that she will not make major changes on the successful political and social program started by Lula in attempt to continue development.

Lula is approved by 80% of the population and most of his

popularity is due to the social welfare program called "Bolsa Família". This program consists of a monthly amount of Reais (the Brazilian currency) which every poor family with children receives in order to afford their food and other basic needs⁴. The condition being that the children go to school and are vaccinated. This is positive aid and can gradually promote social mobility since the transition from lower to higher classes is made possible through education.

Although the above mentioned programs have contributed for social and economic development in Brazil, it is necessary to highlight some other issues that should be taken into consideration with regard to progress in a country like Brazil.

Despite this positive evolution, Brazil has other (serious) social challenges to face, such as lack of a strong educational system and corruption. First of all, let's focus on education or take education as an example. Beside financial support, students need a good education system: decent physical spaces for schools, qualified teachers and the opportunity to pursue higher education. Though the disparity between public and private schools is still pronounced.

Most public universities provide the best higher education in the country and they are free of charge. One just has to pass the entrance exam to be admitted. However students from private secondary schools are more likely to succeed than the ones from public schools. In order to pass the exams, the latter are obliged to follow, in general, expensive complementary courses in order to compete for a place at a public university. There are governmental initiatives such as the PROUNI, that aim to give financial support to students of private universities. However, such programs are still being improved to reach more students⁵. Currently, many have to work during the day and follow evening courses in order to afford the tuition fees of private institutions, where there are more places and therefore less competition.

Corruption and clientelism also limit development for obvious reasons. In several regions it is a current practice for electors to trade their votes for a small (promise of) material help from local politicians. One of the biggest scandals during the present government took place in 2005 when the President's party (Workers Party) was accused of

[24]

paying R\$25000 (€10850) monthly to all congressmen who were willing to vote in favour of government's proposals⁶.

According to World Bank statistics, Brazil's governance score for control of corruption (in a -2.5 to + 2.5 scale) has increased from -0.13 to +0.21 in 2002 but dropped to -0.07 in 2009⁷. These and other corrupt practices have to be tackled by efficient justice procedures and, even more important, by good education of the new generations. If it fails to happen, the poor risk to continue, conditioned by their environment's structures, accommodating themselves in a "less bad" situation instead of striving for a "much better" one.

Brazil is doing well in combating extreme poverty but it should not lose the focus on the bigger picture. The Brazilian government should intensify investment in education and in combating corruption. This will be the order which would form a solid fundament for real progress in the next decades.

¹ E. Fottorino, "Lula, l'homme de l'année 2009" (<http://www.lemonde.fr>).

² <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/BR?display=graph>.

³ Human Development Reports (<http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/BRA.html>)

⁴ “Bolsa Família” (family allowance) is granted to every family whose monthly per capita income is less than R\$140 (€60). Childless families who live below the poverty line (having an income of less than R\$70 per month (roughly €30) can receive a basic benefit of R\$68 (€30). If the assisted families have children, they can cumulate benefits going from R\$22 (€9,50) to R\$33 (€14) per child to a limit of R\$200 per family. Local governments can provide extra assistance. The Brazilian minimum wage amounts R\$510 (€218). However, this is unrealistic to suppose it finances quality health care, quality food, schooling and culture. I will limit my argument to the education issue. Sources: Caixa Economica Federal

http://www.caixa.gov.br/Voce/Social/Transferencia/bolsa_familia/saiba_mais.asp; Ministry of Work and Employment http://www.mte.gov.br/sal_min/default.asp)

⁵ “PROUNI – Universidade para todos”, is a social program created in order to make access to higher education easier “for everybody” through partial and integral scholarships. It has benefited 421000 students in 2010.

⁶ The supposed participants in the scandal of 2005 will be judged by the end of 2011. <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/834826-julgamento-domensalao-no-supremo-deve-comecar-no-final-de-2011.shtml>; <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/jul/11/brazil>

⁷ http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp.

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PAKISTAN: WHAT'S NEXT?

Kevin Keyaert

Pakistan, what's next? Indeed, contemporary international politics are currently dominated by the tenacious war in Afghanistan, but little is known about the exact role and position of its neighbour Pakistan. Due to the recent floods, it has increasingly been made clear that the state of the country has become dangerously precarious for the Pakistani people. In cooperation with the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies and its regional section Leuven India Focus, a roundtable discussion was set up by the international affairs student association KIB. A number of notable speakers joined the table on behalf of various views of present-day Pakistan, while Professor Idesbald Goddeeris (Faculty of Arts, K.U. Leuven), led the discussion.

"The Pakistani government deserves a break", editor-in-chief of MO* magazine Gie Goris initiated. He believed it is common knowledge that its government lacks substantial functionality, but is all of this easy criticism justified? "The scale of the floods was so big", he said, "the Pakistani government didn't perform that badly, the humanitarian aid was okay. It was badly portrayed". An important economic factor contributing to the problem is considered to be found in the failed distribution of wealth. An increase of 7% economic growth was assessed, but have the Pakistani people enjoyed the benefits of this promising revival?

The country's history has been crucial in putting up the settings for the course of recent developments. The surge of Islamic tendencies in Pakistan has altered a great deal. "Being a frequent visitor of the region", Goris continued, "Starting from 1974, the country became a state for Muslims, but it never completely transformed into a political Islam like in Iran". There are a number of misconceptions about the mala fide movements related to the agents of terrorism. Pakistan is often placed in the same category as Afghanistan, "but it is not at the verge of collapsing, although there was indeed a challenge." Moreover, it is crucial to distinguish Pakistani Taliban from

Jihadi Taliban. Goris stated that it is often described as if Al-Qaeda is present, but this is not necessarily true.

Subsequently, cultural philosopher and South Asia journalist Marc Colpaert made a rather romantic introduction. He started mesmerizing about his stay in Pakistan during the 1980s, but ultimately alluded on Pakistan's path dependency. "The period between 1979 and 1988 was decisive". The Islamisation of Pakistan became a fact after the coup d'état of general Zia-ul-Haq, overthrowing Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir's father. This caused a shift in their international relations. "The influence of Saudi Arabia was clearly present at that time, mosques were built, major changes occurred, diversity decreased, Christians emigrated, and an Islamic law system was implemented. Pakistan became a monocultural Islamic state, because only the Saudi Arabian *Wahhabi* Islam was introduced". Thus, although the majority of the Pakistani people did not affiliate with this particular strain of Islamic belief, they were powerless to see their country facing cultural subversions of extreme proportions.

The discussion appeared to be remarkably balanced since KIB invited a Brussels-based diplomat representing the Pakistani government. Syed Moazzam H. Shah, First Political Secretary of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, started out with addressing the university students in front of him. He thought it was necessary to inform young people about such complex issues. As representative of his country, he seemed determined to elucidate his views so that the public would acquire a more thorough insight in the matter. According to him, explaining the issue too often generates a lot more questions than before the information initially was conveyed. He stated that he acknowledged the radicalisation after the Saudi Arabian percolation. "A lot was happening at that time during the eighties. Refugees were coming in following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, while ties were strengthened with the United States. All these events had a heavy impact on Pakistan, even until this day". He argued that Taliban in Afghanistan should be distinguished from other Afghan people. "After the fall of the Najibullah-regime in 1992 and the withdrawal of the Russians", he

continued, “a vacuum was created, a number of warlords emerged and chaos struck the whole country. That is when the Taliban managed to gain influence in Afghanistan. It was during the war that relationships with the Taliban were developed”. He recounted that the Pakistani state only got hold of the support of the Saudis, who obviously had their stakes in the country, as well as from other countries such as the United Arab Emirates.

Concerning the power of radical Islamic groups in Pakistan, Shah clarified that there are no reasons to proclaim that Pakistan is on the verge of being overthrown by radical Islamic parties. “Their representatives only possess a few seats in parliament. There is no future for radical Islam in Pakistan. They don’t have the seats, so no Islamic government can be formed. Regarding the military forces, the only Islamic military can be found in Kashmir. Today’s military is not infiltrated by Islam”.

The final speaker of the evening was Marius Heino, Deputy Head of the Pakistan Unit of the European Commission’s Directorate-General External Relations. He elaborated on the European Union’s account in the course of the EU-Pakistan [28]

relations. “After the takeover of Pervez Musharraf in 1999, relations between the EU and Pakistan entered a frozen state”. Heino argued that three cooperation agreements were kept on hold until 2004 because the Pakistani elections were flawed. “It became a challenging relationship”. Eventually, he explained, “In February 2007, a joint commission was established in Berlin, which rendered a renewed stable relation”. Moreover, he added that the Pakistani parliamentary election of February 2008, shortly after Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, has been observed by the EU. This indicated that the voting process was relatively transparent and pluralistic. However, a few months later, President Musharraf was threatened with impeachment, but eventually decided to resign after all. From that moment on the widow of Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, was elected president. Finally, the EU Representative summed up a number of EU programs that focused on enhancing the EU-Pakistan relations and others that worked out a keen strategy for the whole region.

In the second round of discussion, the Pakistani diplomat elaborated on a number of current problems, particularly pointing out the devastations that the people had to deal with after the floods. The massive havocs caused a lot of people to be displaced and this covers an immense area. "We are not only talking about the emergence of waterborne diseases", he stressed, "Considering the fact that Pakistan primarily is an agrarian society, the economic prospect of many farmers has been shattered since a lot of fields were largely devastated". Since, for instance, textile production accounts for 8,5 % of the GDP of Pakistan, cotton fields can not anymore provide for the necessary income for these rural communities. All this is extremely bad news for the achieved economic growth that the country has been experiencing. The number of investments will drop, although \$ 10 billion will be required to sustain all of the projects. Shah further explained that in Pakistan the provincial governments have the responsibility in taking the lead in the recovery and the reconstruction plans.

But what does the EU do? "€ 80 million of fresh funds have been

gathered to tackle specific areas of the ravages related to the floods. Besides direct financial support, the *Friends of Democratic Pakistan* initiated policy dialogue." This group gathers a number of countries who aim at extending the support for the democratic government in Pakistan. They do this in order to strengthen democracy and back up social and economic development in the country. Heino concluded that "the readiness is definitely there."

"Reconstruction will be addressed together with the existing problem of water scarcity and the water management system," Goris argued, "The floods aggravated these problems." Additionally, he believed that the cultural divide will be crucial in the further course of the country. This disparity between the urban elite and rural population is considered to be a potential menacing factor. Then, Goris went on that Pakistan should get rid of its "India obsession" – mainly revolving around the Kashmir issue – because it causes major overspending for military purposes. This is why negotiating is urgently necessary he said. Moreover, a functional educational system is needed to get the agrarian society developed.

Marc Colpaert took the final word. "Pakistan still is a feudal state", he emphasized. "If Pakistan cannot set up a good educational system, things will worsen progressively." He reflected on the idea of teaching in Urdu in order to tackle the poignant problem of illiteracy, regarding the fact that merely 38% of the Pakistani people is considered to be literate. Now that the floods demolished a large area of land, many schools (*madrassah*) have disappeared into oblivion. This has brought about a major

relapse in the sustainability of the development of the state of Pakistan.

It is clear after this roundtable that there are certainly things on the move but that Pakistan still faces many challenges as well, both internally and externally, ranging from political to social and humanitarian issues. This roundtable can be considered as an opportunity for further thinking on the situation and for a more profound debate.

YES WE CAN(CUN)?**Maite Morren**

From 29 November until 10 December the 16th UN Climate Summit took place in Cancun, Mexico. Belgium, which then held the EU presidency, had an important role to play in coordinating and representing the position of the EU in these negotiations.

The crucial point at the Cancun Climate Summit was determining a plan regarding a binding and global agreement on mitigating climate change; in particular, the expected rising temperatures. The goal would be to limit global warming to maximum 2°C. To reach this goal concrete targets had to be reached on: (1) A reduction of CO2 emissions, which is the main cause of climate change. (2) A mechanism for financing support for developing countries in their efforts to mitigate climate change and to adjust to its possible consequences. As the richer countries would have to provide the funding for developing countries, this is one of the most difficult aspects of the negotiations. (3) The reduction of CO2-emissions caused by deforestation, by protecting precious rainforests, for instance those in Brazil, Congo, Indonesia. Every 2 seconds a part of the world's rainforest the size of a football field is being destroyed. In

total only 20% of the world's rainforests remains. This is not only detrimental to the well-being of the local population for whom these forests are also the basis of their daily lives, but also for the biodiversity in these forests. Moreover, the negative impact on the climate is also of great concern. Rainforests store vast quantities of CO2. The problem of deforestation is the main reason why a country such as Congo, despite not being very industrialized, is on the 21st place in the global ranking of countries emitting most CO2. (4) New technology that would facilitate reducing CO2 emissions. This would mean stimulating innovation, but also encouraging technology transfers from richer countries to the developing world. In order to insure that environmentally friendly technology is used around the world, sharing knowledge is pivotal. (5) A more stringent control system and

more comparable measurements on action plans against climate change.

The general public interest, the hope and the expectations there were for the Copenhagen Climate Summit were certainly not here now. It can even be argued that the Copenhagen Summit was such a disappointment that the enthusiasm - and the budgets - to organize large-scale campaigns on the Cancun Summit was even hard to find among environmental NGOs; out of fear that activists and supporters would get disillusioned, and in the hope that a better occasion for a mass campaign would arise soon. That is understandable, but at the same time: being present at a demonstration such as the Climate Demonstration in Brussels (28th November 2010) does not cost a thing.

Copenhagen indeed was a failure. Firstly, the Copenhagen Agreement was non-binding. Furthermore, no concrete progress was made on crucial issues such as CO2 emission reductions and how the richer and industrialized countries would financially support the developing world in climate change mitigation and the transition to a green economy. Highlights from the Copenhagen [32]

black book are without doubt: (1) That the Copenhagen Agreement states that temperatures should only rise by 2°C, but forgets to mention how this target should be achieved. (2) The lack of help to developing countries. The EU proposal to put aside 7,2 billion euros in aid sounds generous, but various NGOs, such as ActionAid, have already unveiled that the so-called extra funding results from rearranging pre-existing funds. (3) Copenhagen was also a failure of democracy. From all over the world, politicians, prominent state leaders and their staff were present in Copenhagen and still there was no agreement. It made us doubt the people that should represent us and defend the common good.

The Copenhagen negotiations epitomized the failing of our political leaders and of solidarity. Climate change is all about solidarity, or the lack of it. For it is precisely those who are least to blame for the cause of climate change, that are likely to suffer the most. The people in the developing world and the poor among us will be the worst hit by the possible impact of climate change. In the developing countries there will be an increase in food scarcity, disease, homelessness and mass migration.

In the more wealthy countries the poor will be the ones who will be able to prepare less for the negative impact of climate change.

As the well-known study by Nicholas Stern from the London School of Economics demonstrates, the choice between acting now in fighting against climate change or postponing action – until it is too late? – should clearly be one of action now. Therefore we urgently need more investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency and in the preservation of our rainforests. Acting now will cost us much less, in terms of human lives and also in terms of financial costs, than forever postponing action.

So what to think about the Climate Summit in Cancun? There was an agreement, and that is already something, but certainly not enough. For instance, there was no concrete plan on raising the current and far too little ambitious emission reduction targets. Next to this, there is no clarity on the sources of the promised financial support for developing countries. Although the results of the Cancun Summit are better than those of Copenhagen, there is still much to be done in order to save the climate. We might just have to wait until the 17th UN Climate Summit in Durban, South Africa, for more concrete results.

INFO

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CALENDAR**Your eye on the world!****Upcoming Events:**

Week 6	07-11/02	KIB @ LOKO International Info Fair
7	14-18/02	
8	21-25/02	
9	28/02-04/03	Info Meeting @ Pangaea
10	07-11/03	Debate
11	14-18/03	<i>Second Issue of Global</i>
12	21-25/03	Movienight
13	28/03-01/04	Debate: "Eyes on Europe"
14	04-08/04	Trip to NATO Headquarters & SHAPE
15	11-15/04	Easter Holidays
16	18-22/04	Easter Holidays
17	25-29/04	
18	02-06/05	Trip to the Exhibition "America - It's also our history"
19	09-13/05	<i>Third Issue of Global</i>
20	16-20/05	
21	23-27/05	
22	30/05-03/06	Study Period
23	06-10/06	Study Period
24	13-17/06	Exam Period
25	20-24/06	Exam Period
26	27/06-01/07	Exam Period
27	04-08/07	Member's BBQ